On The Cost Distribution of a Memory Bound Function by Rosenthal, David S. H.
ar
X
iv
:c
s/0
31
10
05
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  6
 N
ov
 20
03
On The Cost Distribution of a Memory Bound Function
David S. H. Rosenthal
Stanford University Libraries
Stanford, CA 94305
http: // www. lockss.org
Abstract
Memory Bound Functions have been pro-
posed for fighting spam, resisting Sybil attacks
and other purposes. A particular implementation
of such functions has been proposed in which the
average effort required to generate a proof of ef-
fort is set by parameters E and l to E · l. The
distribution of effort required to generate an in-
dividual proof about this average is fairly broad.
When particular uses of these functions are en-
visaged, the choice of E and l, and the system
design surrounding the generation and verifica-
tion of proofs of effort, need to take the breadth
of the distribution into account.
We show the distribution for this implemen-
tation, discuss the system design issues in the
context of two proposed applications, and sug-
gest an improved implementation.
1 Introduction
Following Abadi et al[1], Dwork et al [2]
suggest imposing computational costs on the
senders of e-mail by requiring the mail to be ac-
companied by a proof of effort generated using a
class of Memory Bound Functions (MBF). Specif-
ically, they propose a concrete implementation
called Algorithm Mbound. The average compu-
tational effort, measured in cache misses, it re-
quires to generate a proof of this kind is set by
two parameters E and l. Generating a proof re-
quires on average E · l cache misses, verifying it
requires l cache misses.
The distribution of effort required to gener-
ate an individual proof about the average of E · l
is fairly broad. When particular uses of MBF are
envisaged, the choice of e and l, and the system
design surrounding the generation and verifica-
tion of proofs of effort, need to take the breadth
of the distribution into account.
We show this distribution and examine the
resulting design issues in the context of the use
of MBF both to impede spammers, and to assist
the LOCKSS1 (Lots Of Copies Keep Stuff Safe)
system in resisting attacks [3]. We then propose
an MBF implementation that has a better gen-
eration cost distribution and other advantages.
2 Memory Bound Functions
In this section we introduce Memory Bound
Functions, and describe their application in spam
prevention and in the LOCKSS protocol.
2.1 Background
The goal of a Memory Bound Function is to
cause the generator of a proof to incur C cache
misses and thus RAM accesses. If each of these
takes t seconds, the generator must have used C ·t
seconds on a real computer.
Algorithm MBound has two adjustable pa-
rameters, the cost of verifying an effort proof l
and the ratio, E, between l and the cost of con-
structing the proof. We measure all costs in cache
misses, so a proof costs E · l cache misses to con-
struct and l cache misses to verify. It uses an in-
compressible fixed public data set T larger than
any cache it is likely to meet. A proof generator
who must expend effort E · l is given as challenge
a nonce n (so that older effort proofs cannot be
reused) and the values of E and l. In response,
the generator must perform a series of pseudo-
random walks in the table T . Each starting point
is determined by an index s which starts at zero
and is incremented for each walk, or trial. The
walk computes a one-way value A based on n, s
and the encountered elements of table T . The
walk is dependent on n and s; it is constructed
so that the number of encountered elements is
l, and fetching each encountered element causes
an L1 cache miss. Each walk, therefore, causes l
1LOCKSS is a trademark of Stanford University.
cache misses.
The generator stops when the value A com-
puted by the walk has 0 bits in its least significant
e = log2 E positions. It is thus expected the gen-
erator will try on average 2e walks with different
starting positions determined by successive val-
ues of s before finding an appropriate starting
position i, costing C = E · l cache misses.
The i that yielded the appropriate A is the
effort proof. The verifier need only perform the
random walk on T starting with the n he chose
and the i sent by the generator, costing V = l
cache misses. If the resulting A has the proper
0-bits in its last e positions, the verifier accepts
the effort.
There is some non-zero probability that the
proof search will take longer than any given num-
ber of steps. Dwork et al acknowledge this indi-
rectly when they say:
“If i > 22e the [verifier] rejects the
message (with overwhelming probabil-
ity one of the first 22e trials should be
successful).” [2]
Indeed, but what of the poor proof gener-
ator who had, using their parameters, expended
more than 242 cache misses (about 10 days) and
still failed to find a proof? It isn’t just the verifier
who must reject extremely long proofs, but also
the generator. In any practical implementation
of Algorithm MBound, account needs to be taken
of the fact that some proportion of the attempts
to generate a proof will fail simply because they
took too long.
2.2 Use of MBF in Spam Prevention
The idea of using MBF to prevent spam
is for a receiver to refuse to accept mail that is
not accompanied by “postage” in the form of a
proof of effort based on the sender’s alias, the re-
ceiver’s alias and the body of the message. The
average amount of effort would be set to prevent
an individual machine, even the fastest available,
sending more than a few thousand mails per day.
The goal of the spam adversary would be to re-
duce the actual effort required to send spam be-
low this average.
2.3 Use of MBF in LOCKSS
The LOCKSS system implements a peer-to-
peer network of persistent, muutally suspicious
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Figure 1: Histograms of number of trials and per-
centage of total cost for e = 15
web caches used to preserve access to e-journals.
The LOCKSS protocol requires a peer A request-
ing a service from a peer B to obtain a nonce from
B, then provide B with a proof of effort based on
that nonce representing more effort than B will
need to perform the requested service. B veri-
fies this effort before performing the service and
returning the result to A. In the LOCKSS proto-
col, the service peers provide each other is that
of voting on the digest of blocks of content. The
proofs of effort prevent a conspiracy of a minor-
ity of malign peers overwhelming these votes, or
cheaply swamping the system in bogus polls.
3 Distribution of Proof Generation Effort
Figure 1 shows the behavior of Algorithm
MBound using the authors’ choice of e = 15. We
show histograms of the percentage of proof gen-
erations whose search ended after a given number
of trials, and of the percentage of the total cost
of proof generation due to those proofs. Note the
skewed distributions; the majority of proofs take
less than expected but, because they are cheap,
the majority of the cost is due to proofs taking
longer than expected.
From this data we see that:
• Even though the average cost of a proof is
32768 trials, more than 63% of the proofs are
found in less than 16384 trials. The median
proof lies between 8192 and 16384 trials,
• There is almost 0.1% probability of finding
a proof in 32 trials or less.
• There is almost 12% probability of finding a
proof in 4096 trials or less.
• 9% of the total cost represents proofs taking
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Figure 2: Histograms of number of trials and per-
centage of total cost for e = 6
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Figure 3: Histograms of number of trials and per-
centage of total cost for e = 12
more than four times as long as expected.
• 40% of the total cost represents paths taking
more than twice as long as expected.
This behavior is not an artifact of the par-
ticular value of e they choose. Figures 2, 3, 4
show the behavior for e = 6, 12, 18 respectively.
4 Design Issues
In this section we discuss the issue raised
by this distribution of effort proof costs for both
the spam prevention and LOCKSS protocol ap-
plications.
4.1 What Does The Proof Prove?
At first sight it might appear that after the
fact, the verifier of a proof knows how much effort
was used to find it. The proof i in Algorithm
MBound is, after all, a count of the number of
trials. Although the verifier finds that index i
produces a path terminating with a value with e
low-order zero bits, that does not prove that no
path j < i produces such a path. The verifier
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Figure 4: Histograms of number of trials and per-
centage of total cost for e = 18
does not know that the generator started with
index 0.
It is important to observe that the proof
shows only that the generator did something
that, averaged over a large number of repetitions
by a generator using exactly the procedure spec-
ified, required approximately 2e · l path steps.
The actual number of steps for the proof in
question is unknown; it is quite likely to be less
than 2(e−3) · l. The average number of steps can
be strongly influenced by the point at which the
generator abandons the search as taking too long,
a parameter that the generator doesn’t reveal to
the verifier. This uncertainty about the relation-
ship between the requested and actual effort is a
problem for both cases.
4.2 Tails of the Distribution
The left tail of Figure 1 is a region in which
the cost of proofs curve is below the number of
proofs curve. If a generator could manipulate
things to increase the probability of being in this
region it could generate proofs more cheaply than
the verifier expects. Similarly, the right tail is a
region in which the cost of proofs curve is above
the number of proofs curve. If a generator could
manipulate things to decrease the probability of
being in this region it could generate proofs more
cheaply than the verifier expects.
Both tails of the cost distribution pose
problems for the LOCKSS protocol:
• The significant population of low-cost proofs
provides an adversary with a good chance of
finding a proof much faster than expected.
• The significant proportion of the cost repre-
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sented by the small proportion of very long
proofs allows an adversary to roughly halve
his cost with little impact on his strategy
simply by terminating the search for a proof
early and failing to vote.
The LOCKSS protocol uses random chal-
lenges which appear to prevent attacks analo-
gous to “chosen plaintext” attacks on encryp-
tion systems. Unfortunately, the fault-tolerance
of the protocol allows the adversary to selectively
refuse to supply expensive proofs and thus bias
the “plaintext” towards cheap proofs.
Analogous difficulties arise in the applica-
tion of Algorithm MBound to spam prevention.
At first sight this case is also immune from a
“chosen plaintext” attack, since the proof must
be based on the text of the e-mail, its source and
destination address, and so on. Unfortunately:
• Spammers already perturb the text of their
messages with random garbage their victims
will ignore but which helps evade signature-
based spam filters. They could choose a e-
mail text and try many possible starting in-
dices in parallel. If none produced a cheap
proof, they could perturb the e-mail text and
try again.
• Similarly, no individual recipient of spam is
important. By terminating the search for
a proof early; the spammer loses a propor-
tion of the intended recipients but reduces
his cost much more.
4.3 Adjusting Costs
The LOCKSS protocol needs to vary the
additional costs imposed via the MBF scheme
over a wide range to match the economic require-
ments of the protocol to the cost of the underly-
ing hashing.
The LOCKSS application requires consid-
erable freedom in setting costs, whereas for best
results Algorithm MBound requires the values of
e and l not to be too small, and incrementing e
increases the cost by a factor of two. With these
restrictions, the choice of e and l can be a prob-
lem.
Even in the spam application, setting prices
of 0 (from known senders) or 1 (from unknown
senders) for all e-mail “postage” lacks flexibility.
An ideal design would allow the recipient to ac-
cept less “postage” from senders it trusted more.
4.4 Timing Uncertainty
To limit the possibility an adversary could
“time-shift” and use a single computer to gen-
erate many votes in a single poll, the LOCKSS
protocol sets deadlines by which a generator must
deliver a proof. To do so, it must adjust for
the difference between fast and slow memory sys-
tems. Dwork et al report this is a factor of 5. In
addition, when using Algorithm MBound it must
also adjust for the possibility that the generator
may find a proof in many fewer or many more
steps than expected. This “slop” in the timing
defeats the purpose of the deadlines.
This uncertainty is not a problem in the
spam application; since the recipient only sees
the fixed time taken to verify the proof.
5 Requirements for MBF
The LOCKSS protocol’s requirements for a
cost function were stated [3] as:
“First, it must have an adjustable cost,
since different amounts of additional ef-
fort are needed at different protocol
steps. Second, it must produce effort
measurable in the same units as the cost
it adjusts (hashing in our case). Third,
the cost of generating the effort must be
greater than the cost of verifying it.”
To these we can now add:
• The distribution of actual effort involved in
generating proofs of effort about the pre-
dicted mean cost must be narrow.
• It must not be possible for an effort gener-
ator to significantly reduce the average cost
of proof generation by failing long proofs se-
lectively.
• The proof must be concise, not requiring
much data to be transmitted.
• The effort must be continuously adjustable.
In fact, we would like our proof to prove
that the generator performed exactly E · l steps.
6 An Alternative MBF
Consider a mechanism in which the genera-
tor is asked to produce not a single index i which
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results in a value with e low-order zeros, but a
list of all i in a specified range which result in
values with e − m low-order zeros, where 2m is
the expected number of such values. The verifier
can cheaply verify some indices randomly chosen
from the list, if any are invalid the proof is in-
valid. The more indices are verified, the more
sure the verifier is of the effort expended by the
generator. If the verifier considers extra verifica-
tion effort justified, a search of some randomly
chosen intervals between the indices in the list
that revealed indices resulting in values with the
required number of zeros would also render the
proof invalid. The generator doesn’t know which
indices and ranges the verifier will check, so can-
not include bogus entries without risking discov-
ery.
In this way we force the generator to explore
an entire range of indices, rather than stopping
at the first one. The number of trials needed to
generate a proof is fixed, because every index in
the requested range must be checked if the gen-
erator is unwilling to risk the cheat being discov-
ered. This satisfies the first two of our additional
requirements.
There will be considerable variation in the
cost of verifying a proof, depending on how sure
the verifier wants to be that the generator actu-
ally exerted the requested effort.
This mechanism has some attractive fea-
tures:
• There is no uncertainty as to the amount
of effort exerted by the generator; unless it
is willing to risk detection it must perform
exactly the effort requested.
• The verifier never performs more effort than
the generator; it can stop as soon as any trial
is invalid.
• The more effort the verifier performs, the
better the verification. The amount of this
effort can be adjusted to match the verifier’s
suspicion of the generator. This property is
valuable in both applications we consider:
– Spammers wish to conceal their true
identity behind a screen of proxies,
making it unlikely that a recipient
would engage in repeated transations
with the same apparent spammer iden-
tity. But a recipient normally has re-
peated transactions with many legiti-
mate e-mail senders; reducing the cost
of verifying their identities would re-
duce the total cost of the system to a
recipient.
– In the LOCKSS case, repeated trans-
actions are the norm and this property
would be very useful.
• It provides another parameter with which to
adjust the cost of the proofs requested from
a generator, namely the size of the range of
indices to be searched. In the LOCKSS case,
this helps adjust the effort requested to the
economic requirements and the underlying
hash cost.
• In effect, we have converted the uncertainty
in time inherent to Algorithm MBound into
uncertainty in size; there is a non-zero prob-
ability that every value in the requested
range on indices has the required number
of low-order zeros and must be included in
the proof. There is no upper bound on the
time required by Algorithm MBound, there
is none on the message size required by our
new scheme.
Note that in this scheme there may not be
any indices i in the requested range which result
in values with e − m low-order zeros. Thus an
empty list of indices is potentially a valid proof
of effort, albeit one that is anomalously expensive
to verify. If an empty proof is valid, verifying
it takes as much effort as generating it. If it is
invalid, the first valid path found in the range
shows this. On average this takes 1/2m of the
effort that should have been used to generate the
proof. This poses a problem; an adversary can
generate empty proofs free and cause verifiers to
waste on average 2(e−m) trials to reveal they are
invalid:
• In the spam case, the recipient should reject
all empty proofs. A sender finding an empty
proof should perturb the message and try
again.
• In the LOCKSS case, the requestee should
reject all empty proofs. If the parameters
can be set to make empty proofs sufficiently
rare, the fault tolerant nature of the protocol
means that this will have little effect.
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7 Setting Parameters
The authors chose parameters for Algo-
rithm MBound that prove 215 paths each 212
steps long, and thus 227 cache misses. To choose
comparable parameters for our scheme, we start
by setting m = 4 to keep the average proof size
to 16 indices or 64 bytes. If we use the same
path step mechanism as Algorithm MBound, we
also need to set l = 2048 and thus need a range
of 2e = 215 indices to search. We thus look for
paths generating a value with (e −m) = 11 low-
order zeros. With these choices, the probability
that all 215 trials fail to find any such path is
(1− 1/24)2
15
or about 10−7.
8 Future Work
We have yet to implement our new scheme
in the LOCKSS protocol. We expect it to re-
solve many tricky issues that arose in our at-
tempt to use Algorithm MBound. Doubtless,
other tricky issues will arise as we proceed. It
may well be that the path generation part of Al-
gorithm MBound is not the best choice for gen-
erating the larger number of smaller sub-proofs
that our scheme needs; this is the subject of fur-
ther exploration.
9 Conclusion
We have shown that the actual cost, mea-
sured in the number of trials, needed to generate
a proof of effort using Algorithm MBound has a
fairly broad distribution. We have identified a
number of design issues this raises for a practical
application of this scheme to both its intended
spam prevention purpose, and for adjusting the
cost of operations in the LOCKSS protocol. We
suggest an alternative scheme, in which the cost
of generating a proof is fixed and the cost of ver-
ifying a proof can be adjusted by the verifier to
match his suspicions of the generator.
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Appendix
We used the abstract model implemented
by the program below to generate the data for
the figures. We had two reasons for this:
• Running large numbers of effort proofs is
time-consuming.
• We wished to demonstrate that the problems
we identify are a consequence of the way the
proof search is organized and not of the par-
ticular cryptographic features of Algorithm
MBound.
The program generates graphs similar to those of
an actual implemenation of Algorithm MBound
for low e.
import java.text.*;
import java.io.*;
public class MBFcost {
static double[] numTry = new double[32];
static double[] costTry = new double[32];
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static double totalCost = 0;
static long e = 0;
static double p = 0.0;
static int maxTries = 0;
public static void main(String args[]) {
long m = (long)Integer.parseInt(args[0]);
for (e = 3; e <= m; e += 3) {
initialize();
fillHistogram();
outputHistogram();
}
}
static void initialize() {
for (int i = 0; i < numTry.length; i++) {
numTry[i] = 0.0;
costTry[i] = 0.0;
}
p = 1.0/((double) (1 << e));
maxTries = (1 << (e + 8));
}
static void fillHistogram() {
double probSoFar = 1.0;
for (int i = 1; i < maxTries; i++) {
int b = bin(i);
// The probability of a run ending
// on try i is 1/2^e times probability
// of not having ended before
probSoFar *= (1.0 - p);
double probHere = p * probSoFar;
numTry[b] += probHere;
// Thus the cost of a run ending on
// try i is i/2^e
double c = ((double) i) * probHere;
costTry[b] += c;
totalCost += c;
}
}
static void outputHistogram() {
NumberFormat nf =
NumberFormat.getNumberInstance();
nf.setMinimumFractionDigits(2);
try {
FileOutputStream numFOS =
new FileOutputStream("data/e" + e +
"/tries.dat", true);
PrintWriter numberPW = new PrintWriter(numFOS);
FileOutputStream costFOS =
new FileOutputStream("data/e" + e +
"/cost.dat", true);
PrintWriter costPW = new PrintWriter(costFOS);
for (int i = 0; i < (e + 8); i++) {
String pcTry = nf.format(numTry[i] * 100);
String pcCost =
nf.format((100*costTry[i])/(totalCost));
numberPW.println(i + "\t" + pcTry);
costPW.println(i + "\t" + pcCost);
}
numberPW.close();
costPW.close();
} catch (FileNotFoundException ex) {
// No action intended
}
}
static int bin(int p) {
int ret = 0;
if (p < 0)
p = -p;
while (p != 1) {
ret++;
p >>>= 1;
}
return ret;
}
}
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